Scholars have wondered for a long time whether the language of quantum mechanics introduces a quantum notion of truth which is formalized by quantum logic (QL) and is incompatible with the classical (Tarskian) notion. We show that QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic language L P Q of assertive formulas, which formalize statements about physical systems that are empirically justified or unjustified in the framework of quantum mechanics. According to this interpretation, QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic notion of empirical justification within quantum mechanics rather than properties of a quantum notion of truth. This conclusion agrees with a general integrationist perspective that interprets nonstandard logics as theories of metalinguistic notions different from truth, thus avoiding incompatibility with classical notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of the standard notion of quantum truth are also obtained.
Introduction
Several years ago Dalla Pozza and Garola [1995] constructed a formalized pragmatic calculus L P with the aim of extending a classical propositional calculus stemming from Frege's ideographic language in which the assertion sign is introduced as a constitutive part of the formulas of the logical calculus [Frege, 1879 [Frege, , 1891 [Frege, , 1893 [Frege, , 1918 Reichenbach, 1947; Stenius, 1969] . Dalla Pozza and Garola's extension is obtained by considering a classical propositional calculus (CPC) with standard connectives and formation rules for radical formulas and adding, besides the assertive sign, pragmatic connectives and formation rules for assertive formulas. The radical formulas of L P are then supplied with a classical semantic interpretation, while the assertive formulas are supplied with a pragmatic interpretation in terms of the notion of justification (or proof ). This construction has two goals. Firstly, the authors aim to provide a general framework in which the conflict between the classical and the verificationist theories of truth and meaning can be settled by integrating their perspectives. The verificationist theories of truth, indeed, have been criticized by many scholars, mainly because they assume that a proposition is true iff asserting it is justified, which leads to identify the notion of truth and the notion of justification [Russel, 1940 [Russel, , 1950 Carnap, 1949; Popper, 1969; Haack, 1978] . As Dalla Pozza and Garola point out in their concluding remarks, there are strong intuitive arguments that support the need of avoiding this identification. In fact, the pragmatic notion of justification presupposes the semantic notion of truth, for a proof of a sentence consists in showing that the truth value of the sentence is true. Moreover, there are factual and logico-mathematical sentences that are undecidable, i.e., epistemically inaccessible, though they have a truth value [Carnap, 1932; Russell, 1940] .
Secondly, the authors aim to show that the integration of the (different) notions of truth and justification realized in L P allows one to settle, in particular, the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic in a unified perspective.
The ideas underlying the construction of L P have started a lively debate on pragmatics and related topics [Bellin and Dalla Pozza, 2002; Bellin and Ranalter, 2003; Ranalter, 2006; White, 2008; Carrara and Chiffi, 2013] . It must be stressed, in particular, that the assertion sign introduced in L P has a purely pragmatic role and cannot be identified with an alethic modality operator. Rather, it can be seen as a formalization in the object language of the metalinguistic notion of proof, which cannot be reduced to any acceptable notion of truth. Correspondingly, there are deep syntactic differences between the part of L P formalizing the properties of the classical notion of truth (radical formulas) and the part of L P formalizing the general properties of the notion of justification (assertive formulas). L P thus provides the desired general conceptual framework. To attain their second goal Dalla Pozza and Garola consider an intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) and show that L P contains two partially overlapping structures, ACPC and AIPC (where A stands for assertive) that are isomorphic to CPC and IPC, respectively. Then they show that the pragmatic interpretation of L P induces, through the isomorphism of AIPC and IPC, an interpretation of IPC which recovers in a natural way the standard Brower-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of this calculus in terms of logical proof [Troelstra and Van Dalen, 1988] . The construction of L P can thus help enlightening "the mysteries of the intuitionistic truth" [Van Dalen, 1986 ]. Hence Dalla Pozza and Garola may claim that they have reached their goals.
"The purpose of our interpretation is mainly philosophical. Indeed we aim to settle the conflicts between classical and intuitionistic logic, and between the classical (correspondence) and the intuitionistic (verificationist) conceptions of truth and meaning (see Dummett, 1977 Dummett, , 1978 Dummett, , 1979 Dummett, , 1980 Prawitz, 1977 Prawitz, , 1980 Prawitz, , 1987 ; this will be done by introducing an integrated perspective which preserves both the globality of logic (in the sense of the global pluralism, which admits the existence of a plurality of mutually compatible logical systems, but not of systems which are mutually incompatible or rivals, see Haack 1978, Chapter 12) and the classical notion of truth as correspondence, which we may consider explicated rigorously by Tarski's semantic theory (see Tarski 1933 Tarski , 1944 . This goal is reached in the present paper by translating CPC and IPC into L P "
The quotation above reminds us that there are several research fields in which non-classical notions of truth are introduced, raising conflicts with classical logic (CL) similar to the aforesaid conflict between intuitionistic logic and CL. A typical example is provided by quantum logic (QL), with its non-classical structure that is claimed to imply a highly problematical notion of quantum truth (a huge literature exists on this topic; the interested reader can find a general review of the attempts at constructing a logic for the language of quantum mechanics till the early seventies in the classical book by Jammer [1974] , and more updated treatments and bibliographies in the books by Redei [1998] and Dalla Chiara et al. [2004] ). One can then wonder whether some of the foregoing conflicts can be settled by resorting to L P and embedding into it the non-classical structures that are considered, as Dalla Pozza and Garola did with intuitionistic logic. The anwer is positive, for such an embedding has been realized in the case of Girard's linear logic [Girard, 1987] by Bellin and Dalla Pozza [2002] . We aim to show in the present paper that a similar result can be achieved if QL is considered. The general scheme provided by L P applies indeed not only when the notion of proof is specified to be a logical proof, as in the case of IPC, but also if it is specified to be an empirical proof (or verification, or empirical justification) in the framework of a specific theory.
Let us resume the main lines of our work. By considering the notion of truth in quantum mechanics, we observe in Sect. 2 that our program has to face a deep problem from the very beginning. Indeed, truth and verification are strictly entangled in the standard interpretations of quantum mechanics. To avoid this problem we introduce a generalization of L P in Sect. 3 (still denoted by L P , by abuse of language) admitting a partial classical semantics for radical formulas. This semantics can be particularized to fit in with various different interpretations of quantum mechanics. If one adopts a suitable orthodox interpretation or a modal interpretation, our notion of truth weakens the classical notion but does not conflict with it. If one accepts the generalization and reinterpretation of quantum mechanics (extended semantic realism, or ESR, model ) proposed by Garola together with some collaborators [Garola and Sozzo, 2009 , 2010 , 2011a , 2011b , 2011c , 2012 Garola and Persano, 2013; Garola et al., 2013 , our notion of truth coincides with the classical notion. Based on this generalization, we select in Sect. 4 a sublanguage L P Q of L P in which the notion of proof is specified to be the notion of empirical proof in quantum mechanics. We then show in Sect. 5 that this specification induces a homomorphism of L P Q onto QL: hence, an interpretation of QL as a structure formalizing the properties of the metalinguistic notion of justification according to quantum mechanics, not the properties of a notion of truth alternative to the classical notion. 1 Our aim is thus reached. We conclude our work by comparing in Sect. 6 our result with a similar result in the literature, showing the advantages of the approach proposed in this paper.
To close, we note that our generalization of L P is important also independently of quantum mechanics, because it makes L P a more powerful tool for coping with a variety of problems.
On the notion of truth in quantum mechanics
We recall that one can distinguish two basic classes of interpretations of quantum mechanics, the statistical and the realistic interpretations [Busch et al., 1991 [Busch et al., , 1996 . According to the former quantum mechanics deals only with probabilities of measurement outcomes, and no reference to single examples of physical systems (briefly, individual objects in the following) is allowed. According to the latter quantum mechanics deals with individual objects and their physical properties. 2 The statistical interpretations, however, imply an instrumentalist view that has been severely criticized from an epistemological viewpoint. For instance, Timpson [2006] writes: "The point is, instrumentalism is not a particularly attractive or interesting interpretive option in quantum mechanics, amounting more to a refusal to ask questions than to take quantum mechanics seriously. It is scarcely the epistemologically enlightened position that older generations of physicists, suffering from positivistic hangovers, would have us believe."
We add that nowadays experimental physicists often claim that they can deal with individual objects, not only with statistical ensembles. But if one accepts a realistic interpretation, then an orthodox physicist would observe that, generally, no value can be assigned to the observables of a physical system independently of a measurement context, even if one knows the state of the system. This typical feature of quantum mechanics is supported by some famous "nogo" theorems, as Bell-Kochen-Specker's [Bell, 1966; Kochen and Specker, 1967) ] and Bell's [Bell, 1964] , stating the contextuality and the nonlocality (i.e., contextuality at a distance) of this theory, respectively (see, e.g., [Mermin, 1993] ). It implies that, generally, no truth value can be assigned to sentences attributing 1 This procedure does not strictly match the procedure that led Dalla Pozza and Garola to recover intuitionistic logic within L P . The reason of this is that the axioms of AIPC (which make AIPC isomorphic to IPC) are sentences of L P that are pragmatically valid (p-valid) in L P , for they characterize a notion of logical proof. When considering QL one should instead introduce in L P Q also axioms that characterize the empirical notion of proof that is adopted in quantum mechanics. These axioms could be sentences of L P Q that are not p-valid. We therefore avoid a purely axiomatic approach, which would make our task uselessly complicate.
2 We stress that the term "realistic" is used in a very weak sense here, and does not imply any (wave or particle) model for individual objects. In particular, one could subsitute the term "individual object" with the term "activation of a preparing procedure" to avoid ontological committments [Ludwig, 1983] . physical properties to individual objects in a given state without taking into account the measurements that will be performed (also at a distance). Thus, truth and verification by means of measurements could not be distinguished in quantum mechanics, whose language would require the adoption of a (non-classical) verificationist theory of truth. This remark about truth in quantum mechanics raises a deep problem, as we have anticipated in Sect. 1. It implies in fact that the general scheme provided by the original formulation of L P does not fit in with a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, because no truth value could be defined on the set of radical formulas of L P (whenever these formulas are interpreted as sentences of the language of quantum mechanics) independently of the justification value of the corresponding assertive formulas.
To avoid the above problem one could accept the ESR model proposed by Garola et al. in the papers quoted in Sect. 1. This model in fact generalizes quantum mechanics and circumvents the "no-go" theorems by reinterpreting quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Contextuality and nonlocality are thus avoided, and truth values can be assigned according to classical rules, independently of measurements, even if quantum mechanics is unable to predict all of them. However, the ESR model is not yet accepted by the majority of physicists, who firmly stand on the standard interpretation. But we can make our attempt at recovering QL as a sublanguage of L P acceptable also within an orthodox physical perspective by introducing a generalization of L P which admits truth assignments on radical formulas that are not defined everywhere and can be specialized according to the interpretation of quantum mechanics that is selected (the partial classical semantics mentioned in Sect. 1). Such a generalization takes into account the widespread realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which the impossibility of assigning values to the observables of a given physical system independently of the measurement context does not apply to all observables. Indeed, for every state S of the physical system there are physical properties that are objective, in the sense that quantum mechanics associates with them probability 1 (hence probability 0 to their complementary properties). These physical properties are then said to be real (or actual ) in the state S (see in particular [Jauch, 1968; Piron, 1976; Busch et al., 1991 Busch et al., , 1996 Aerts, 1999] ; for the sake of brevity we will refer to this interpretation simply as the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics in the following). Equivalently, every individual object in the state S possesses them, independently of any measurement. In semantic terms this feature can be restated by saying that, according to the foregoing realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, each sentence attributing a physical property to an individual object in a given state has a truth value whenever either the property or its complementary property is real. This value is true in the former case, false in the latter, and does not depend on the measurement context. Hence truth and verification can be distinguished if one refers to the subset of real properties (which varies with the state of the physical system). But, of course, only partial truth assigments are introduced in this interpretation.
It is important to observe that our generalization fits in well also with the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics, which distinguish between dy-namical states and value states [Lombardi and Dieks, 2014] . Dynamical states correspond to standard quantum states and allow assigning truth values according to the rules resumed above. But the set of sentences having truth values is determined by the value state of an individual object and it is generally broader. Nevertheless, every truth assigment is still partial, and can be considered as an instantiation of our general semantics.
3 The generalized pragmatic language L P Let us summarize sintax, semantics and pragmatics of a pragmatic language L P which generalizes the language denoted by the same symbol in the paper by Dalla Pozza and Garola [1995] .
Alphabet. The alphabet A P of L P contains as descriptive signs the propositional letters p, q, r,...; as logical-semantic signs the connectives , ∧, ∨, → and ↔; as logical-pragmatic signs the assertion sign ⊢ and the connectives N , K, A, C and E; as auxiliary signs the round brackets (,).
Radical formulas. The set ψ R of all radical formulas (rfs) of L P is made up by all formulas constructed by means of descriptive and logical-semantic signs, following the standard recursive rules of classical propositional logic. We denote by φ R the subset of all rfs consisting of a propositional letter only (atomic formulas).
Assertive formulas. The set ψ A of all assertive formulas (afs) of L P is made up by all rfs preceded by the assertive sign ⊢ (elementary afs), plus all formulas constructed by using elementary afs and following standard recursive rules in which N , K, A, C and E take the place of , ∧, ∨, → and ↔, respectively. We denote by φ A the subset of all elemantary afs of ψ A .
Semantic interpretation. Let us introduce a family {σ S } S∈S , where S is a set of states which play the role of possible worlds in Kripkean semantics and σ S is a function which maps a subset φ RS of φ R (the domain of σ S ) onto the set {1, 0} of truth values (1 standing for true and 0 for false). We assume that φ R = ∪ S∈S φ RS , so that, for every α ∈ φ R , at least one state S exists such that α ∈ φ RS . Then, for every S ∈ S, let us extend σ S to the set ψ RS ⊆ ψ R of all rfs which contain only atomic formulas that belong to φ RS , following the standard truth rules of classical propositional logic. We call assignment function this extension, denote it by σ e S , and call semantic interpretation of L P the family {σ e S } S∈S . We stress that we do not assume that φ RS is a proper subset of φ R : if φ RS = φ R , then ψ RS = ψ R and σ e S reduces to a classical assignment function. In general, however, {σ e S } S∈S can be considered as a weakened classical semantics for L P .
Pragmatic interpretation. Whenever a semantic interpretation {σ e S } S∈S is given, a pragmatic interpretation of L P is defined as a family {π S } S∈S , where π S is a pragmatic evaluation function which maps ψ A onto the set {J, U } of justification values (J standing for justified and U for unjustified ). We assume that each π S satisfies the following justification rules (where α and δ play the role of metalinguistic variables), which refer to {σ e S } S∈S and are based on the informal properties of the metalinguistic concept of proof in natural languages. JR 1 . Let S ∈ S and α ∈ ψ R . Then, π S (⊢ α) = J if α ∈ φ RS and a proof exists that σ e S (α) = 1, π S (⊢ α) = U otherwise. JR 2 . Let S ∈ S and δ ∈ ψ A . Then, π S (N δ) = J if a proof exists that δ cannot be justified, π S (N δ) = U otherwise. JR 3 . Let S ∈ S and δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ ψ A . Then, (i) π S (δ 1 Kδ 2 ) = J iff π S (δ 1 ) = J and π S (δ 2 ) = J, (ii) π S (δ 1 Aδ 2 ) = J iff π S (δ 1 ) = J or π S (δ 2 ) = J, (iii) π S (δ 1 Cδ 2 ) = J iff a proof exists that π S (δ 2 ) = J whenever π S (δ 1 ) = J, (iv) π S (δ 1 Eδ 2 ) = J iff π S (δ 1 Cδ 2 ) = J and π S (δ 2 Cδ 1 ) = J.
Let us add some terminology and comments on JR 1 -JR 3 . First of all, for every S ∈ S and δ ∈ ψ A we briefly say in the following that δ is justified (unjustified ) in S whenever π S (δ) = J (U ).
Secondly, let us recall that rules JR 2 , JR 3 (iii) and JR 3 (iv) make reference to a notion of proof that belongs to a higher logical level with respect to the notion of proof involved in rules JR 1 , JR 3 (i) and JR 3 (ii) [Dalla Pozza and Garola, 1995] . To make this point clear, let us concentrate on JR 2 (JR 3 (iii) and JR 3 (iv) will not be needed in the following) and let us consider an example. Let S ∈ S and α ∈ φ RS . Then, stating that ⊢ α is unjustified means that we do not possess any proof of α, but does not prohibit that a proof of α can be produced: hence it does not imply that N ⊢ α is justified. The af N ⊢ α is instead justified iff a proof exists that a proof of α cannot be produced: hence, in particular, if a proof exists that α is false. Thus, π S (N ⊢ α) = J implies π S (⊢ α) = U , but the converse implication does not hold.
Thirdly, let us note that the following correctness criterion holds in L P because of JR 1 .
CC. Let S ∈ S and α ∈ ψ RS . Then, π S (⊢ α) = J implies σ e S (α) = 1.
4 The quantum pragmatic language L P Q As we have anticipated in Sect. 1, we aim to pick out in this section a sublanguage of L P and specify the notion of proof as empirical proof in quantum mechanics. For the sake of clearness we will proceed by steps.
Alphabet and formation rules
The quantum pragmatic language L P Q is the sublanguage of L P defined by the following syntactic restrictions.
The set ψ Q A of all afs of L P Q is the set of all afs of L P in which only rfs in ψ Q R and the logical-pragmatic signs ⊢, N and K occur.
Because of R 1 and R 2 , the set ψ Q A of afs of L P Q is made up by all formulas constructed by means of the following recursive rules.
(
The restrictions expressed by R 1 and R 2 are obviously introduced to make it possible to contrive an intended interpretation of L P Q in terms of quantum physics. In order to justify R 1 , R 2 and our further assumptions on L P Q , let us discuss this interpretation in some details.
The intended interpretation of L P Q .
Let Ω be a physical system, characterized in quantum mechanics by a set E of (first order) physical properties, and let U be a set of individual objects. 3 We introduce a mapping ext : S ∈ S −→ extS ∈ P(U) (where P(U) is the power set of U) such that {extS} S∈S is a partition of U, and say that extS is the extension of S. Then we provide a physical interpretation of the rfs of L P Q by assuming that a bijective mapping exists
such that the following semantic condition holds.
SC. Let α ∈ ψ Q R , S ∈ S, and let a ∈ extS. Then, the sentence E α (a) is true (false) iff α ∈ ψ Q RS = φ RS and σ S (α) = 1 (0). The sentence E α (a) formalizes the informal sentence "the individual object a has the physical property E α " (to avoid proliferation of symbols we do not distinguish here between a physical property and the first order predicate expressing it). If a is in the state S (i.e., a ∈ extS), then SC links the truth value of E α (a) with the truth value assigned by σ S to α. We stress that SC implies that E(a) takes the same truth value for every individual object in the state S.
Based on the above interpretation, the set S can be identified with the set of all quantum states in the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, or with the set of all value states in some modal interpretation, or with the set 3 We recall that "physical properties" and "individual objects" can be considered as theoretical terms of the language of quantum mechanics, which can be operationally interpreted as follows. An individual object a ∈ U corresponds to the activation of a preparation procedure p belonging to a set of preparation procedures associated with Ω. A physical property E ∈ E corresponds to a subset of a set of dichotomic registering devices associated with Ω. Each device of this subset, if activated in succession with the activation of p, performs a measurement on a, after which a either displays E or not (in this sense we say that E is testable) [Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981; Ludwig, 1983; . We remind, however, that there are physical properties in quantum mechanics that are incompatible, in the sense that they cannot be tested conjointly. of all microscopic states in the ESR model (see Sect 2). We do not choose one of these interpretations at this stage, for we wish our treatment to be as general as possible. We only assume that S is a set of pure states and do not consider mixtures, to avoid the more complicate formalism required to deal with the latter kind of states in quantum mechanics.
The intended interpretation of the afs of L P Q is now immediate if the term proof in JR 1 -JR 3 is meant as empirical proof, that is, a proof following from quantum mechanics, which is the physical theory that is considered in this paper.
Bearing in mind the intended interpretation above and footnote 3, it is apparent that R 1 in Sect. 4.1 is introduced to select only rfs that have a truth value for some state S and can be interpreted as testable, or verifiable, sentences, i.e., sentences such that physical procedures exist which test their truth value (which does not always occur, because of incompatibility of properties, in the case of nonatomic, or molecular, rfs; note that a similar restriction has been introduced by Dalla Pozza and Garola [1995] when recovering intuitionistic propositional logic within L P ). R 2 is introduced instead for the sake of simplicity, since only the pragmatic connectives N and K are relevant to our goals in this paper.
The semantics of L P Q
The semantics of L P Q is obtained by restricting the assignment functions defined on ψ R to ψ Q R = φ R . Hence, for every S ∈ S, the assignment function σ e S reduces to σ S and its domain ψ Q RS ⊆ ψ Q R coincides with φ RS . Moreover, the semantic condition SC requires us to add the following semantic principle.
SP. Every assignment function σ S defined on ψ Q R is consistent with the intended interpretation of L P Q , that is, it preserves the relations among truth values of rfs of L P Q established by the laws of quantum mechanics. To illustrate SP let us supply an example. Let α 1 , α 2 ∈ ψ Q R , S ∈ S, and for every a ∈ extS let the laws of quantum mechanics imply that E α 2 (a) is true whenever E α 1 (a) is true. Then, σ S must be such that α 1 ∈ ψ Q RS and σ S (α 1 ) = 1 imply α 2 ∈ ψ Q RS and σ S (α 2 ) = 1. The semantic principle SP does not provide, however, any explicit rule for establishing whether a rf α ∈ ψ Q R has a truth value in a given state S, and whether this value is true or false. To make SP more explicit, let us take into account the possible interpretations of the set S mentioned in Sect. 4.2.
Let us firstly interpret S as the set of all quantum states in the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Then, let us consider a state S ∈ S and a sentence of the form E(a), with E ∈ E and a ∈ extS. As we have seen in Sect. 2, quantum mechanics assigns a truth value to E(a) iff the probability p(E, S) associated by quantum mechanics itself to the pair (E, S) is 1 (truth value true) or 0 (truth value false). Therefore, let us consider the set
. Bearing in mind the mapping I introduced in Sect. 4.2 and condition SC, we obtain that, for every α ∈ ψ Q R , α ∈ ψ Q RS iff I(α) ∈ E S , and σ S (α) = 1 (σ S (α) = 0) iff I(α) ∈ E T S (I(α) ∈ E F S ). Otherwise, σ S (α) is not defined, that is, α does not belong to ψ Q RS . This specification of the way in which quantum mechanics assigns truth values can be restated to obtain set-theoretical conditions on the assignment functions of the family {σ S } S∈S . To this end, let us consider the set E of all physical properties of a physical system Ω. It is well known that in quantum mechanics E is the support of a lattice structure L(E) = (E, ⊥ , ⋓, ⋒), usually called standard (sharp) quantum logic. In this logic ⊥ , ⋓ and ⋒ are considered as quantum logical connectives. The symbol ⊥ denotes an involutory unary operation on E called orthocomplementation. The symbols ⋓ and ⋒ denote join and meet, respectively, in L(E) 4 . This lattice is orthomodular but not distributive (it also has some further mathematical properties that do not interest us here) [Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981] . Moreover, quantum mechanics associates a subset S E ⊆ S of states with every E ∈ E in such a way that the set S E = {S E | E ∈ E}, partially ordered by the set inclusion ⊆, is a lattice L(S E ) = (S E , ⊆) = (S E , ⊥ , ⋓, ⋒) isomorphic to L(E), and the following properties hold.
(i) For every E ∈ E, S E ⊥ = S ⊥ E . (ii) Let ∩ and ∪ denote set theoretical intersection and union, respectively. Then for every E, F ∈ E,
The truth assigments introduced above can now be restated in set-theoretical terms by referring to the lattice L(S E ). Indeed it can be shown in quantum mechanics that, for every E ∈ E and S ∈ S, E ∈ E T S (E F S ) iff S ∈ S E (S ⊥ E ) [Garola and Sozzo, 2013] . Hence, for every a ∈ extS, a truth value of E(a) is defined iff S ∈ S E ∪ S ⊥ E , which is true iff S ∈ S E , false iff S ∈ S ⊥ E This result can be transformed into an explicit rule for any σ S ∈ {σ S } S∈S , as follows.
TR. Let α ∈ ψ Q R and S ∈ S. Then, α ∈ ψ Q RS iff S ∈ S Eα ∪ S ⊥ Eα , and σ S (α) = 1 (0) iff S ∈ S Eα ( S ∈ S ⊥ Eα ). The truth rule TR provides a set-theoretical semantic interpretation {σ S } S∈S of L P Q that follows from the general principle SP in the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Let us now interpret S as the set of all value states in a modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and let us consider the semantic interpretation {σ S } S∈S in this case. Let a ∈ U and let us put E(a)= {E(a) | E ∈ E}. Then, a belongs to the extension of some value state and the subset of all sentences of E(a) that have a truth value is generally broader than the set of all sentences of E(a) that have a truth value according to the semantic interpretation discussed above. Moreover, the truth values of E(a) ∈ E(a) coincide whenever they are assigned by both interpretations. But it must be stressed that quantum mechanics predicts the truth value of E(a) iff E(a) has a truth value also according to the interpretation of S as a set of quantum states (which correspond to the dynamical states in the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics).
Finally, let us interpret S as the set of all microscopic states in the ESR model. In this case the semantic interpretation {σ S } S∈S is such that, for every S ∈ S, ψ RS = ψ R : hence it is a classical semantics for L P Q . If one considers an individual object a ∈ U, then a belongs to the extension of some microscopic state and all sentences of the set E(a) defined above have a truth value. Moreover, the truth value of a sentence E(a) ∈ E(a) coincides with the value of E(a) according to the interpretation of S as a set of quantum states (which correspond to the macroscopic states in the ESR model) whenever the latter value is assigned. But also in this case quantum mechanics predicts the truth value of E(a) iff E(a) has a truth value according to both interpretations.
Bearing in mind the terminology introduced in Sect. 1, we conclude that we have a weakened classical semantics for L P Q in the case of the realistic interpretation or of a modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, while we have a classical semantics for L P Q in the case of the ESR model.
The pragmatics of L P Q
Proceeding as in Sect. 4.3, the pragmatics of L P is obtained by restricting each pragmatic evaluation functions π S defined on ψ A to ψ Q A (this restriction will still be denoted by π S to avoid proliferation of symbols). Moreover, in the case of elementary afs of L P Q we specify the notion of justification as empirical proof by introducing the following pragmatic principle.
PP. Let S ∈ S and α ∈ ψ Q R . Then π S (⊢ α) = J if α ∈ ψ Q RS and the laws of quantum mechanics allow to prove, via intended interpretation, that σ S (α) = 1, π S (⊢ α) = U otherwise.
The notion of proof specified by PP is empirical in the sense that a proof requires the use of the laws of quantum mechanics (ψ Q R contains indeed only atomic rfs). However, it can be considered empirical also in a different sense, because the same proof can be obtained by means of measurements. It can be shown in fact that, if the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is adopted, then quantum mechanics assigns a value true (false) to a sentence E(a), with a in the state S, iff one can perform a measurement of E on a without modifying S [Garola and Sozzo, 2004] .
The notion of justification as empirical proof then extends to afs of ψ Q A that are not elementary via rules JR 2 and JR 3 .
The pragmatic principle PP does not provide, however, any explicit rule for establishing whether the elementary af ⊢ α is justified or unjustified in a given state S. To make PP more explicit, let us show that the intended interpretation in Sect. 4.2 and PP imply that the pragmatics of L P Q can be expressed in settheoretical terms. Indeed, we have seen at the end of Sect. 4.3 that quantum mechanics predicts the truth value of a sentence E(a) iff this value is assigned by the interpretation of the set S as a set of quantum states. Hence, bearing in mind the symbols introduced in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3, we can restate PP as follows.
PP ′ . Let S ∈ S and let S be interpreted as the set of all quantum states.
The justification rule PP ′ specifies π S on the set of all elementary afs of L P Q and constitutes the starting point for our task. In fact, we can now introduce a mapping
, which associates a pragmatic extension S δ with every assertive formula δ ∈ ψ Q A , defining f by means of the following recursive rules.
The pragmatic evaluation function π S can then be calculated by assuming the following recursive justification rules.
Rules JR Q 1 -JR Q 3 specialize JR 1 -JR 3 , respectively, in our present context. They are suggested by the following arguments.
Rule JR Q 1 . From PP ′ and (i). Rule JR Q 2 . Let α ∈ ψ Q RS . Then we must consider three alternatives, that is, S ∈ S ⊢α , S ∈ S ⊥ ⊢α and S / ∈ S ⊢α ∪ S ⊥ ⊢α . If S ∈ S ⊢α , then ⊢ α is justified in S because of JR Q 1 : hence no proof exists that ⊢ α cannot be justified, which implies that N (⊢ α) is unjustified. If S ∈ S ⊥ ⊢α = S N (⊢α) , then α is false because of the TR rule (Sect. 4.2) and (i): hence a proof exists that ⊢ α cannot be justified in S, which implies that N (⊢ α) is justified in S. If S / ∈ S ⊢α ∪ S ⊥ ⊢α , then α has no truth value according to the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics (even if a value can be actualized by suitable measurements, and it can be true), but α can have a truth value according to the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and it has a truth value in the ESR model. Hence no proof of α is provided by quantum mechanics, but no proof exists that ⊢ α cannot be justified in S, which implies that N (⊢ α) is unjustified in S.
Rule JR Q 3 . Let α 1 , α 2 ∈ ψ Q RS . Then the af (⊢ α 1 )K(⊢ α 2 ) is justified iff ⊢ α 1 and ⊢ α 2 are justified, that is, iff S ∈ S ⊢α1 and S ∈ S ⊢α2 : hence, iff S ∈ S ⊢α1 ∩ S ⊢α2 = S ⊢α1 ⋓ S ⊢α2 = S (⊢α1)K(⊢α2) .
The pragmatic interpretation of quantum logic
Bearing in mind the definition of the mapping f in Sect. 4.4, the justification rules JR Q 1 -JR Q 3 can be unified by the following rule.
Based on JR Q , one can introduce a preorder (binary, transitive) relation ≺ on ψ Q A .
OR. Let δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ ψ Q A . Then, δ 1 ≺δ 2 iff, for every S ∈ S, π S (δ 1 ) = J implies π S (δ 2 ) = J.
It follows from JR Q and OR that δ 1 ≺δ 2 iff S δ 1 ⊆ S δ 2 . It is then apparent that the mapping f is an order homomorphism of (ψ Q A , ≺) onto (S E , ⊆). Since f (N δ) = S δ ⊥ and f (δ 1 Kδ 2 ) = S δ1 ⋓ S δ2 , we briefly say that f makes the connectives N and K correspond to the lattice operations ⊥ and ⋓, respectively. Furthermore, let us introduce a derived connective A Q in L P Q , defined by the equation
. Hence, f makes the connective A Q correspond to the lattice operation ⋒. Thus, our homomorphism shows that the quantum logical connectives ⊥ , ⋓ and ⋒ can bear an interpretation as logical-pragmatic signs rather than logicalsemantic signs.
The above interpretation can be made more cogent by introducing an equivalence relation ≈ on ψ Q A , defined as follows. ER. Let δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ ψ Q A . Then, δ 1 ≈δ 2 iff, for every S ∈ S, π S (δ 1 ) = J iff π S (δ 2 ) = J. JR Q and ER imply indeed that δ 1 ≈δ 2 iff S δ 1 = S δ 2 . Let us consider the quotient set ψ Q′ A = ψ Q A / ≈ and the relation ≺ ′ canonically induced on ψ Q′ A by the relation ≺ defined on ψ Q A . Then, ≺ ′ is a partial order (binary, transitive, antisymmetric and reflexive) on ψ Q′ A . Moreover, the mapping f induces an order isomorphism of (ψ Q′ A , ≺ ′ ) onto (S E , ⊆). Hence (ψ Q′ A , ≺ ′ ) is an (orthomodular) lattice, in which lattice operations N ′ , K ′ and A Q′ are defined which correspond to the operations ⊥ , ⋓ and ⋒ defined on S E , respectively. These operations are related to the connectives N , K and A Q by the following equations.
We have thus obtained a pragmatic structure (ψ Q′ A , ≺ ′ ) = (ψ Q′ A , N ′ , K ′ , A Q′ ) which is isomorphic to the quantum logic (S E , ⊆) = (S E , ⊥ , ⋓, ⋒) introduced in Sect. 4.3. These two structures can then be identified.
Conclusions
The results stated at the end of the preceding section are philosophically important. They imply that QL can be embedded into L P and considered as a pragmatic structure, formalizing the properties of empirical justification in quantum mechanics rather than a notion of quantum truth specific of this theory. Our aims in Sect. 1 are thus reached. Of course this achievement has a price. Indeed, if one adopts a realistic or a modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, one can reconcile QL with a classical notion of truth at the expense of weakening this notion by introducing partial truth assignments. A complete reconciliation of QL with classical logic is possible only by accepting the reinterpretation of quantum probabilities introduced by the ESR model. In any case, our result provides a further example of the explanatory power of the (generalized) pragmatic extension L P of classical logic, in which different logical systems may coexist without conflicting because they are interpreted as formalizing different metalinguistic concepts.
It remains to observe that conclusions similar to ours have been drawn by Garola [1992 Garola [ , 2008 and by Garola and Sozzo [2013] . To be precise, the latter authors consider a classical predicate calculus L(x) and enrich it by introducing a physical preorder (which is implied by the logical order but generally does not coincide with it) induced by the theory-dependent notion of "certainly true in a state S". They then recover a structure isomorphic to QL by selecting a subset of sentences of L(x) that are verifiable according to quantum mechanics and adding a physically justified orthocomplementation. 5 Our present approach, however, is more general in several senses. Firstly, it is constructed in such a way to allow an orthodox physical interpretation of the truth values that are assigned to the radical formulas of L P . On the contrary, Garola and Sozzo's approach introduces a classical semantics on L(x) which has a physical meaning only if one adopts the reinterpretation and generalization of quantum mechanics introduced by themselves (that is, the ESR model). Secondly, Garola and Sozzo's procedures are, paraphrasing Salmon's classification of scientific explanations [Salmon, 1989] , "bottom-up", because they explain QL in terms of basic logical and physical structures. On the contrary, our present procedures are "up-down". Indeed, they are based on the (generalized) language L P , which has a pragmatic interpretation that does not depend on specific physical theories and is suitable for recovering different non-standard logics by specifying different notions of proof. Hence our interpretation of QL as a pragmatic structure constitutes an instantiation of a general method in a special case (empirical quantum proof). 5 Garola and Sozzo's procedures also lead to recover classical Boolean structures whenever the language of classical mechanics is considered and all sentences are assumed to be verifiable. It is noteworthy, however, that they show that structures isomorphic to QL can be obtained in classical mechanics if the notion of verification is suitably restricted. This result proves that QL occurs because of the notion of verification that is adopted and does not characterize quantum mechanics, consistently with a known position of some scholars concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics [Aerts, 1988 [Aerts, , 1991 [Aerts, , 1995 [Aerts, , 1998 [Aerts, , 1999 .
